Population aging and economic growth in Asia by Bloom, David E. et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Economic Consequences of Demographic Change in 
East Asia, NBER-EASE Volume 19
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Andrew Rose, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-38685-6
ISBN13: 978-0-226-38685-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_08-2
Conference Date: June 19-21, 2008
Publication Date: August 2010
Chapter Title:  Population Aging and Economic Growth in Asia
Chapter Authors:  David E. Bloom, David Canning, Jocelyn E. Finlay
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8148
Chapter pages in book: (61 - 89)
61
2
Population Aging and 
Economic Growth in Asia
David E. Bloom, David Canning, and Jocelyn E. Finlay
2.1   Introduction
The demographic transition and evolution of past birth and death rates 
in Asia have brought about dramatic shifts in the age structure between 
1960 and 2005 (Bloom, Canning, and Fink 2008). The combined forces of 
declining fertility, increasing life expectancy, and the transitional dynamics 
of varying cohort sizes moving through the age distribution have led to the 
rapid aging of societies across much of Asia.1 From 1960 to 2005, China 
experienced the largest absolute increase in life expectancy in the world. 
During the same period, the total fertility rate in the Republic of  Korea 
plummeted from 5.7 to 1.1—a change that only a handful of countries have 
experienced. Japan boasts the highest life expectancy in the world at 85.6 for 
women and 78.7 for men, and it continues to rise.
With a decline in fertility, in the short run the youth- age population share 
declines and the working- age share increases. Working- age people contrib-
ute to the labor force more than youth- age, and if  these individuals are 
gainfully employed (Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay 2007), then while 
income per worker can remain the same, income per capita increases. In 
Asia, the decline in the total fertility rate from a regional average of 6.05 
(see table 2.1) in 1960, to a regional average of 2.63 has brought with it an 
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1. Aging in Asia has been particularly dramatic, but it is also taking place in nearly all other 
regions of the world.
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increase in the working- age share. However, as the total fertility rate falls 
below the replacement rate in many Asian countries, the working- age share 
will decrease in the long run (Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay 2009b) and 
old- age shares will increase.
As reviewed in Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2008), a popular view of the 
negative eﬀects of aging is born of the growth accounting calculation. If labor 
supply and savings behavior remain unchanged, then labor supply, as well as 
savings (and thus income) per capita would decline as old- age shares increase 
and working- age shares decline. However, the dramatic change in family 
structure creates avenues for behavioral change. With fewer children to care 
for and the support of elderly parents to care for children and contribute to 
household expenses, individuals who are of working age may be able to work 
more than they could previously. Savings patterns may change as life expec-
tancy, income potential, and expenditure requirements change. Furthermore, 
incentives to invest in one’s own and one’s children’s education may change 
as life expectancy increases and earning opportunities expand. These behav-
ioral eﬀects may add up to oﬀset the negative accounting eﬀects of aging.
There are three key drivers of population aging: fertility decline, increase 
in life expectancy, and age- structure dynamics. When we factor in the behav-
ioral responses to the changes in the various demographic variables, we fi nd 
that these diﬀerent demographic forces have diﬀerent eﬀects on economic 
growth. The decline in fertility causes an increase in the female labor supply 
(Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay 2009a), an increase in life expectancy 
will alter savings incentives (Bloom, Canning, and Moore 2007), and a com-
bination of factors leads to increased investment in education per person. 
The accounting eﬀects of aging, combined with these behavioral responses, 
mean that aging has an ambiguous eﬀect on economic growth.
Changing institutional settings compound the complexity of analyzing 
the eﬀects of  aging on economic growth. Reforms in social security and 
diminished adherence to fi lial piety make for a transformative situation for 
identifying the responsible agent for elder support and care: adult children, 
the state, own savings or labor supply, or a company pension.
Will aging have a negative eﬀect on economic growth in Asia? This is the 
key question that we explore in this chapter. In the next section we break 
down what we actually mean by aging and illustrate the role of  fertility 
decline and mortality improvements on shifts in age structure. In section 2.3 
we use regression analysis to identify the statistical relationship between age 
structure and economic growth in Asia, and discuss the various behavioral 
responses to aging in the Asian context. A summary follows.
2.2   Population Aging in Asia
We classify a population with an increasing share of old- age persons as 
one that is aging. This shift in the age structure is brought about by a decline 
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in fertility that reduces the number of youth, and thus with no change in the 
size of the elderly population, the elderly share increases. An increase in this 
share can also come about by a disproportionate increase in the survival of 
individuals aged sixty- fi ve and older relative to the improvement in survival 
rates of other age groups. An increasing share of old- age individuals can 
also result from past variation in birth and death rates. These three forces all 
contribute to the trend in most Asian countries of an increasing proportion 
of individuals aged sixty- fi ve and older (fi gure 2.6).
The reason for the fertility decline is a contentious issue debated among 
economists and demographers. Bongaarts (1984; 1994; 1999) argues that 
the improvements in contraceptive access have aided the decrease in fertil-
ity rates. But Pritchett asserts that access to contraception cannot explain 
why fertility rates have fallen by so much, so quickly, and that a shift in 
preferences explains most of the plummet in fertility rates (Pritchett 1994). 
Deciphering why the total fertility rate has fallen in Asia is not the focus of 
this chapter; we analyze the economic consequences of the observed decline 
in the total fertility rate and the associated increase in old- age population 
shares.
Improvements in life expectancy in many Asian countries between 1960 
and 2005 in large part refl ect declines in child mortality. Improvements in 
mortality can be attributed to public health interventions (for example, 
improvements in nutrition and the provision of water and sanitation) and 
to medical interventions such as vaccine coverage and the use of antibiotics 
(Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras- Muney 2006). But health disparities within Asia 
remain broad: childhood mortality remains high in Laos and Cambodia, for 
example; life expectancy is the highest in the world in Japan, and survival to 
sixty is close to certain; and adult mortality is high in West Asian countries 
relative to East Asia. Despite the disparities, life expectancy has increased 
in all Asian countries (see table 2.1) between 1960 and 2005.
Aging is also a consequence of the dynamic evolution of past fertility and 
mortality rates. Cohorts move through the age groups of the population 
age distribution. The size of the eighty to eighty- fi ve age group in 2000 will 
depend on births between 1915 and 1920 and the mortality rates this cohort 
experienced as it aged. When the total fertility rate falls below replacement, 
the birth cohort will be smaller than the parent cohort (excluding migration 
eﬀects).
In this section, we examine the eﬀect of fertility and mortality changes 
between 1960 and 2005 on age structure. This exercise illustrates the domi-
nant role of the fertility decline in shaping the increase in the proportion 
of old- age individuals. We illustrate how age structure will change between 
2005 and 2050 as a consequence of fertility and mortality changes during 
that period. We also discuss the eﬀects of the dynamic evolution of changes 
from 1960 to 2005 in mortality and fertility rates on age structure changes 
between 2005 and 2050.
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2.2.1   The Eﬀects of Mortality and Fertility Changes on Age Structure
In fi gure 2.1, we illustrate the eﬀect of fertility and mortality changes on 
age structure between 1960 and 2005. As an example of how to interpret 
these graphs, consider India and the zero to fi ve age group. The fertility 
eﬀect of approximately 0.07 indicates that if  fertility rates had remained at 
1960 rates, then in 2005 the fraction of individuals aged zero to fi ve years old 
would be seven percentage points higher. The mortality eﬀect of approxi-
mately – 0.001 indicates that if  age- specifi c mortality rates had remained 
at 1960 rates then the fraction of individuals in the zero to fi ve age group 
would be 0.1 percentage points lower than it actually is today. For each of 
the represented Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Vietnam, China, Japan, 
Republic of Korea), we see that the fertility changes have had a much greater 
eﬀect on age structure than the mortality changes. In fi gure 2.1, we see that 
the fertility decline in the six example countries has had a similar eﬀect on 
the respective country’s age structure (though the eﬀect in Japan is minimal). 
If  fertility rates had remained at 1960 rates, youth population shares would 
be higher, working- age shares would be lower, and old- age shares would be 
lower2. Figure 2.1 illustrates the accounting eﬀect of a decline in fertility 
leading to an increase in the working- age share (or, as the graph represents: 
if  the fertility rate had not fallen from 1960 rates, the working- age share 
would be lower). As to the mortality eﬀect, we see that in four of the six ex-
ample countries3 if  mortality rates had remained at 1960 rates then the youth 
population share would be lower (as more of the children would have died). 
With the exception of  Vietnam and possibly China, working- age shares 
would be higher (as improvements in mortality have been concentrated in 
the childhood age groups).
The cohorts born in the 1960 to 2005 period do not reach the sixty- fi ve 
and older age group until 2025 to 2070. Even so, the fertility decline between 
1960 and 2005 has an eﬀect on the sixty- fi ve and older age group share. In the 
case of India in 2005, fi gure 2.1 illustrates that if  the total fertility rate had 
remained at the 1960 rate then the sixty- fi ve and older age- group population 
shares would be lower. Changes in the total fertility rate in the present do 
not aﬀect old- age population sizes in the present, but they do aﬀect old- age 
population shares in the present.
For the age structure of a population to change (with zero migration), 
either (a) the fertility rate must change, (b) there must be heterogeneous 
change in the age- specifi c mortality rates, or (c) there must have been past 
variation in mortality and fertility rates.
2. Old- age shares would be lower in all example countries except for the case of Japan, where 
the fertility decline between 1960 and 2005 has been very small relative to the other example 
countries.
3. Japan is diﬀerent as in 1960 child mortality rates were already very low compared to the 
other example countries.
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As shown in fi gure 2.1, the eﬀect of fertility changes on age structure in 
the selected Asian countries has been much more dramatic than mortality 
changes (even for China, where female life expectancy climbed from 37.6 
to 73.7). As the improvements in life expectancy are a result of improve-
ments in mortality rates across all of  the age groups, the proportion of 
individuals in each age group does not change much even in the face of 
such steep life expectancy improvements. However, fertility improvements 
are concentrated in the 0 to 1 age group, which leads to an immediate eﬀect 
on age structure.
A change in fertility or a heterogeneous change in mortality has a cohort 
eﬀect that will have an instantaneous eﬀect on age structure. Importantly, 
this eﬀect will persist through the age distribution as cohorts move through 
the diﬀerent age groups. These population dynamics imply that changes in 
the 1960 to 2005 period will continue to aﬀect the age structure through the 
2005 to 2050 period (as discussed in section 2.2.3).
2.2.2   The Problem of Aging Societies
The problem with an aging society is that the number of old- age depen-
dents will increase relative to the number of working- age individuals. With-
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Fig. 2.1  The infl uence of fertility and mortality change on age structure shifts, 
1960– 2005
Source: Authors’ own calculations using United Nations (2007), World Bank (2007), and 
ModMatch in Stata 9.
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out deep analysis, it seems obvious that if  people of working age are the 
workers and people in old age are retired, and that if  changes in the age 
structure of the population bring about no change in behavior (an increase 
in savings, for example), then there will be a rising number of old- age people 
dependent on the support of working- age individuals.
We show in fi gure 2.2 that the working- age to dependents ratio will even-
tually decline throughout Asia, and comparing fi gure 2.3 and fi gure 2.4 we 
can see that this will be due to the declining ratio of working- age people to 
old- age dependents. In all Asian regions the ratio of working- age people to 
old- age dependents will decline (fi gure 2.4); however, the ratio of working-
 age to youth- age dependents will increase in all Asian regions except East 
Asia (fi gure 2.3). In the past, the rise in the working- age share was backed by 
a decrease in youth- age shares. In the future, the decline in the working- age 
share will be backed by an increase in the old- age shares.
The major reason population aging matters is that human productivity 
and human consumption have diﬀerent time profi les. Children consume 
more than they produce. This phase now lasts into the late twenties in many 
countries as they continue in advanced education. Between twenty- fi ve and 
roughly sixty- fi ve are the prime working years, in which production exceeds 
consumption. After age sixty- fi ve, consumption exceeds labor income. In 
most cases the young are supported by intra- family transfers. Support for 
the elderly, who have normal consumption and require medical care, is more 
complex, coming from family support, personal savings, pensions, and social 
security transfers. The mix of these support systems for the elderly diﬀers 
greatly across countries. The coping ability of  transfer systems (whether 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Year 
Eastern South Central 
South East Western 
Fig. 2.2  Ratio of working- age population to dependent population, by Asian region
Source: United Nations (2007).
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mediated by the family or the state) is limited by the rising proportion of the 
elderly and the consequent high burden on the working- age population.
2.2.3   Aging in the Future
In section 2.2.1 we showed that much of the aging of a society is driven by 
the decline in fertility. Sharp declines in the fertility rate decrease the number 
of youth and increase the proportion of individuals in old age, even though 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1950  1960  1970 1980  1990  2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  
Year  
Eastern  South Central
South East  Western  
Fig. 2.3  Ratio of working- age population to youth population, by Asian region
Source: United Nations (2007).
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Fig. 2.4  Ratio of working- age population to old- age population, by Asian region
Source: United Nations (2007).
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the population of old people remains unchanged. Largely as a consequence 
of the fertility decline, age structure shifted sharply between 1960 and 2005. 
Changes in the age structure between 2005 and 2050 also appear to be steep 
in fi gure 2.6. However, by comparing fi gure 2.5 with 2005 and 2050 age 
structure in fi gure 2.6, we see that changes in age structure between 2005 and 
2050 are not fully consequent on changes over that period—in particular 
the age structure changes for the fi fty and older age groups. This is due to 
the fact that, in addition to the 2005 to 2050 fertility and mortality eﬀects 
on age structure, shifts in the age structure between 2005 and 2050 will be 
a result of changes in cohort sizes stemming from steep changes in fertility 
and mortality rates between 1960 and 2005, as these cohorts move through 
the age distribution.
As the fertility rate is already below replacement in many Asian countries, 
and the mortality improvements are diminishing, changes in age structure as 
a result of changes in fertility and mortality changes over the next forty- fi ve 
years will not be as dramatic as they were between 1960 and 2005.4 With 
fertility and mortality rates stabilizing at low levels, the changes in the age 
structure over the next forty- fi ve years will largely refl ect dynamic evolu-
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Fig. 2.5  The infl uence of fertility and mortality change on age structure shifts 
2005– 2050
4. India is an exception to this.
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tion of past birth and death rates, and the age structure will move toward 
stability.
To illustrate the dynamic evolution eﬀects of past birth and death rates 
on the age structure, consider the case of Indonesia in fi gure 2.5. The graph 
indicates that if  fertility and mortality rates remain at 2005 rates, then by 
2050 the share of sixty- fi ve to seventy year olds would be 0.5 percentage 
points less than what the predicted 2050 sixty- fi ve to seventy year old age 
share is, as represented in fi gure 2.6. From fi gure 2.6, we see that the share 
of sixty- fi ve to seventy- year- olds increased by 0.035 (3.5 percent); 0.005 of 
that is explained by fertility and mortality changes between 2005 and 2050, 
but the remainder (0.03) is explained by past variation in birth and death 
rates. Thus aging, the increase in the proportion of individuals, aged sixty-
 fi ve and older between 2005 and 2050 is largely consequent on fertility and 
mortality rate changes prior to 2005.
2.3   Population Aging and Economic Growth in Asia
Asia’s, and in particular East Asia’s, macroeconomic performance is 
tracked very closely by its demographic transition and resulting changes in 
age structure. Estimates indicate that as much as one- third of its “economic 
miracle” can be attributed to a demographic dividend (Bloom and William-
son 1998; Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 2000; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 
2001; Bloom, Craig, and Malaney 2001; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003). 
Another set, due to Kelley and Schmidt (2005) indicates that demographic 
change accounts for 44 percent of income per capita growth from 1960 to 
1990. The fi rst demographic dividend comes about as an accounting eﬀect 
of a decline in fertility and the resultant rise in the working- age share. When 
the fertility rate declines, the working- age share increases as the number of 
individuals of  working age increases relative to the number in the youth 
age groups. With an increase in the working- age share, countries stand to 
benefi t from the proportional increase in the pool of potential workers in 
the economy, and income per capita can increase. By contrast, the absence 
of demographic change also accounts for a large portion of Africa’s eco-
nomic debacle (Bloom and Sachs 1998; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003). 
In addition, the introduction of demographic factors has reduced the need 
for the argument that there was something exceptional about East Asia or 
idiosyncratic to Africa. Most models of economic growth have signifi cant 
region dummies, usually negative for Sub- Saharan Africa and positive for 
East Asia, indicating that the poor performance of Africa and the excep-
tionally good growth performance of East Asia cannot be explained within 
the models. Once age structure dynamics are introduced into an economic 
growth model, these regions are much closer to refl ecting widely understood 
drivers of economic growth (Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 2000) and the 
statistical signifi cance of the region dummy variables disappears.
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The eﬀect of changes in the working- age share on economic growth is 
well- documented. We now turn our focus to the eﬀect of  old- age share 
on economic growth. This analysis is not independent of the relationship 
between working- age share and economic growth. However, when consider-
ing the working- age share aﬀecting economic growth, the downward forces 
of youth- and old- age shares is considered symmetric. In this chapter, we 
treat youth- and old- age shares separately so as not to impose this symmetry 
assumption.
2.3.1   Channels by Which Aging Aﬀects Economic Growth
In section 2.2 of this chapter we illustrated in detail the process of aging 
in Asia. Sharp declines in fertility between 1960 and 2005 had dramatic 
eﬀects on the age structure of the population. Moreover, we showed how 
the age structure will continue to evolve as population cohorts age between 
now and 2050.
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of this shift in age structure on eco-
nomic growth, with a particular focus on Asia. There are many channels by 
which the shift in age structure aﬀects economic growth. In the fi rst instance 
we illustrate the empirical relationship between age- structure shifts and 
economic growth. Secondly, we discuss the behavioral response to a rapid 
shift in the age distribution: household- level life- cycle decisions may be 
infl uenced by society- level age structure composition. The third channel 
we examine is the role of institutional settings in the face of rapid changes 
in age structure. In particular, we look at the role of old- age social security 
and the incentives created by slow- changing laws.
2.3.2   Economic Growth and Age Structure
When analyzing the eﬀects of age structure on economic growth, typically 
the working- age share is isolated as the age group of interest. In the coming 
years, however, concern over the potentially depressing eﬀects of old- age 
dependency on economic growth and the diﬀering eﬀects of  youth- and 
old- age dependency has increased interest in directly observing the partial 
eﬀect of these latter variables on economic growth.
We take the convergence model framework outlined in Bloom and Can-
ning (2008), and dissect population into youth, C, working age, WA, and 
old, O.
Growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per worker is characterized by 
the distance from steady state,
(1) gz  (z∗  z0)
and a vector of variables, X, can aﬀect the steady- state level of labor produc-
tivity. Following the discrete time models in Barro and Sala- i- Martin (2004), 
there is a log- linearization around the steady state. Thus z  log(Y/ L), and 
the steady- state level of income per worker is summarized as,
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(2) gz  (X  z0).
To then utilize this theory of convergence in an income per capita model, 
consider the relationship used in Bloom and Canning (2008) that highlights 
the inclusion of age structure in the form of working- age share,
(3) 
Y

N
  
Y

L
 
L

WA
 
WA

N
.
If  age structure is represented by working- age share, and the participation 
rate is constant, then,
(4) gY/N  gY/L  gWA/N
Growth of income per worker is explained by the convergence term in (2). 
As for the growth of the working- age share, we wish to observe the sepa-
rate eﬀects of youth- and old- age dependency on the growth of income per 
capita and not just the growth of the working- age share. Thus we want to 
identify,
(5) gY/N  gY/L  g (NCO)/N.
To isolate the growth of the youth- and old- age we can draw on rules of 
approximation. Firstly, the diﬀerence in logs is an approximation for the 
growth of the working- age share,
(6) gWA/N ≈ lnWAN t  ln
WA

N 0.
Then, the working- age is the population less the youth- and old- age popula-
tions, so growth of the working age can be redefi ned as
(7) g (NCO)/N  lnN  C  ON t  ln
N  C  O

N 0.
The approximation accuracy of ln(1 – x) ≈ x is increasing in the working- age 
share, and we use this approximation to assert that,
(8) g (NCO)/N  C  ON t  
C  O

N 0
 g (NCO)/N  
C

N0
  
C

Nt
  
O

N0
  
O

Nt
.
Using the following substitutions,
(9) y  logYN , z  logYL , w  logWAN ,
and the fact that taking the logs of both sides of equation (3) gives,
(10) y  z  w.
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Then,
(11) gY/N  (X  z0)  
C

N0
  
C

Nt
  
O

N0
  
O

Nt
 gY/N  (X  w0  y0)  
C

N0
  
C

Nt
  
O

N0
  
O

Nt
 gY/N  X0  CN0   
O

N0
  y0   CNt   
C

N0   
O

Nt
  
O

N0 
 gY/N  X00  1 CN0   2
O

N0
  3y0  4 CNt   5 
O

Nt
.
Thus the eﬀects of youth- and old- age dependency on growth of income per 
capita can be estimated using the specifi cation outlined in equation (11).
An implication of equation (5) is that the coeﬃcients on the change in 
youth- and old- age shares are minus one. Any deviation from this coeﬃcient 
is brought about by misspecifi cation. That is, the youth- age and old- age will 
have heterogeneous eﬀects on income per capita as changes in the youth- 
and old- age shares incite diﬀerent behavioral responses. High youth- age 
dependency will cause women to exit the workforce to care for children. 
Higher old- age shares, in part brought about by higher life expectancies, 
may refl ect lower morbidity thus extending the time which people stay in 
the workforce. Moreover, the older individuals may accumulate capital (we 
control for this in our regression analysis) for a longer period before they 
draw down on savings.
Included in the vector of explanatory variables describing the steady state 
level of GDP per worker, X, are capital stock, education, and institutional 
quality, and other factors that may aﬀect labor productivity. We also include 
a global time trend and a random error term in this vector. To measure the 
growth of income per capita we take the diﬀerence in logs. Thus, the esti-
mated equation is,
(12) ln(yt)  ln(yt1)  1yt1  2edut1  3capt1  4instt1 
  5ct1  6ot16ct  6ot  	i  	t  εit.
Fixed eﬀects with a lagged dependent variable introduce a Nickell (1981) 
bias. Thus, we do not estimate a fi xed eﬀects model and instead we control 
for some potential country fi xed eﬀects with time invariant country specifi c 
geographic variables such as fraction of land in the tropics, and whether the 
country is landlocked or not. We also control for regional dummies.
It is reasonable to be concerned about possible endogeneity of the age 
structure variables in the economic growth equation. Periods of high growth 
may increase the working- age share through migration eﬀects, or have an 
eﬀect on fertility and thus the youth- age population shares (Bloom and 
Canning 2008). To control for this issue of reverse causality, we use fi ve- year 
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lags of the age structure variables (and an alternative instrument set using 
fi ve- year- lag fertility and life expectancy).
Using data from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 
2006) for GDP per capita and Penn World Tables 5.6 for capital stock, and 
demographic data from the World Population Prospects (United Nations 
2007), we estimate the eﬀect of changes in age structure on economic growth. 
In the appendix we detail the data sources with citations.
In table 2.2 we present the descriptive statistics of  all of  the variables, 
including the instrumental variables, in the regression analysis. We see from 
these statistics that a range of countries are represented in the sample: high 
to low income, low to high fertility rates, low to high infant mortality rates. 
In table 2.3 we detail the country lists of the country dummies used. The 
sample of countries is larger than this, and the country lists only detail those 
of the continent dummies included.
In table 2.4, we present the regression results. In column (1), we present the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) results for the long run demographic model. In 
column (2) we introduce the short run eﬀects of youth- and old- age share 
changes. For these latter variables, a change in the youth- or old- age share 
will have an impact in the short run on the annual average fi ve year economic 
growth rate. The initial level of the youth- and old- age shares will aﬀect the 
long run growth rate. In column (3) we present the two- stage- least- squares 
results for the demographic model. We use the fi ve year lag of the youth- and 
old- age change in population share, and the initial year fertility rate and 
initial year infant mortality rate. In columns (4) and (5) we introduce the 
Asian and African continent dummies.
Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics
Variable  Mean  
Standard 
deviation  Min  Max
Five- year growth rate of income per capita 1.35 3.36 –23.48 20.38
Log real GDP per capita 8.44 1.15 5.14 10.49
Capital stock 0.63 1.96 0.00 22.88
Average years of secondary schooling 5.45 2.83 0.35 12.05
Trade openness 65.23 46.14 3.78 462.93
Freedom House Polity Index 6.14 3.30 0.19 10.00
Life expectancy 64.06 11.84 31.20 82.10
Tropical location 0.53 0.48 0.00 1.00
Landlocked 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Youth- age share 0.35 0.10 0.14 0.51
Old- age share 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.20
Youth- age share change –0.01 0.01 –0.07 0.02
Old- age share change 0.003 0.005 –0.012 0.026
Total fertility rate 3.88 1.96 1.08 8.50
Infant mortality rate  53  46  3  199
Note: N  616
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Table 2.4 Regression results
OLS OLS IV OLS IV
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Log real GDP per capita in  –2.184∗∗∗ –2.077∗∗∗ –2.153∗∗∗ –2.037∗∗∗ –2.111∗∗∗
 the base year (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.39) (0.41)
Capital stock in the base 0.140∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
 year (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.041)
Average years of secondary –0.0114 –0.0577 –0.0246 –0.0909 –0.0641
 schooling in the base year (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.078) (0.081)
Trade openness in the base 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗
 year (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0027)
Freedom House Polity  0.152∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
 Index in the base year (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054)
Life expectancy in the base 0.146∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.0748∗∗ 0.0606∗∗ 0.0497
 year (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034)
Youth- age share in the base –19.53∗∗∗ –21.44∗∗∗ –24.68∗∗∗ –18.37∗∗∗ –21.95∗∗∗
 year (3.30) (3.57) (4.41) (3.95) (4.62)
Old- age share in the base –29.46∗∗∗ –18.38∗∗∗ –18.76∗∗ –8.902 –10.87
 year (6.93) (6.77) (7.52) (7.36) (8.19)
Youth- age share change –57.73∗∗∗ –75.70∗∗∗ –53.57∗∗∗ –70.38∗∗∗
(10.5) (14.8) (10.8) (14.3)
Old- age share change –57.18∗∗ –125.2∗∗∗ –64.44∗∗ –149.5∗∗∗
(23.0) (46.6) (25.0) (48.9)
Tropical location –1.103∗∗∗ –0.928∗∗∗ –0.879∗∗ –1.104∗∗ –1.135∗∗
(0.35) (0.33) (0.35) (0.43) (0.44)
Landlocked 0.389 0.506 0.692∗ 0.606∗ 0.754∗
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
Latin America Dummy 0.300 0.259
(0.44) (0.46)
Sub- saharan Africa –0.773 –0.568
(0.56) (0.59)
East Asia Dummy 2.038∗∗∗ 1.895∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.63)
South Central Asia Dummy –0.307 –0.389
(0.59) (0.59)
South East Asia Dummy 1.305∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗
(0.58) (0.58)
Constant 20.40∗∗∗ 22.78∗∗∗ 21.58∗∗∗ 19.14∗∗∗ 21.80∗∗∗
(3.15) (3.24) (3.80) (4.14) (4.58)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 722 720 649 714 643
R2 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.32 0.28
Cragg- Donald F- stat 45.70 40.51
Hansen J p- value      0.411    0.500
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments: fi ve- year lag of the change in the youth- and 
old- age shares, fi ve- year lag of fertility rates and infant mortality rates.
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
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We see from the regression results that changes in both youth- and old- age 
shares over a fi ve- year period have a negative eﬀect on the short run (fi ve 
year) growth rate. This eﬀect is negative and signifi cant even in the two-
 stage- least- squares specifi cations in columns (3) and (5). Once we control 
for the continent dummies, however, the results indicate that the long run 
eﬀect of the level of old- age population share is negative but not signifi cant. 
The long run eﬀect of the level of the youth- age population share is, how-
ever, negative and signifi cant.
Capital stock, trade openness, and institutional quality each have a posi-
tive and signifi cant eﬀect on the fi ve- year growth rate. The signifi cance of 
these control variables is consistent with other studies: even when controlling 
for these core variables that explain cross- country diﬀerences in economic 
growth, the level and change in the age structure of the population have an 
eﬀect on economic growth. Highlighting the importance of demographic 
change in explaining economic growth is a feature of Bloom, Canning, and 
Sevilla (2003) but in this chapter, we treat youth- age and old- age population 
shares as heterogeneous. The positive and signifi cant East Asian dummy 
indicates that on average, over the 1960 to 2005 period, East Asia’s economic 
growth rate was higher than the global average.
Taking the results in column (5) of table 2.4, we can interpret the magni-
tude of the coeﬃcients on the demographic variables. A 10 percentage point 
decrease in the youth- age share, will increase the economic growth rate by 
2.2 percentage points leading to a higher steady state income per capita in 
the long run. From the results, we see that a change in the old- age share 
does not have a signifi cant eﬀect on economic performance in the long run. 
In the short run, if  the change in the youth- age share decreases by 1 percent 
point over a fi ve- year period, then the average annual economic growth rate 
will increase by 0.7 percentage points. If  the change in the old- age share 
increase by 1.0 percentage point then the average annual economic growth 
rate in that fi ve year period will decline by 1.5 percentage points. Thus, the 
increasing old- age shares we observe throughout Asia will have a negative 
eﬀect on economic growth in the short run, but in the long run it does not 
appear that the rising old- age shares will impede economic performance. 
The positive impact of a decline in youth- age shares and the neutrality of 
the old- age shares on economic growth are consistent with the fi ndings of 
Kelley and Schmidt (2005).
In past studies, the positive infl uence of an increase in working- age share 
may, in part, have been a proxy for the decline in youth- age dependents. The 
decline in the working- age share that is to come in East Asia over the next 
forty- fi ve years is coupled with an increase in old- age, and not youth- age, 
dependency. The observed partial eﬀect of  changes in the growth of the 
working- age share on economic growth may diﬀer in the future, as declines 
in the working- age share will be coupled with increases in the old- age share, 
and not increases in the youth- age share. From the regression results in table 
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2.4, however, we see that for East Asia, the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of 
youth- and old- age shares on economic growth is evident in the long run, 
but not in the short run. In the short run, changes in either youth- and old-
 age shares have a similar magnitude of eﬀect on economic growth. However, 
the long run eﬀect diﬀers: in the long run low youth- age shares will have a 
positive eﬀect on economic growth, but high old- age shares may have an 
insignifi cant eﬀect on economic growth.
The results indicate that in the short run both high youth- and old- age 
dependency will have a negative eﬀect on the growth of income per capita. 
But in the long run, when the population age distribution stabilizes, higher 
youth- age dependency will have, for a given working- age share, a negative 
eﬀect on economic growth, whereas higher old- age dependency will have no 
eﬀect on economic growth. This diﬀerence presumably refl ects the inherently 
greater capacity of economies to adapt to changes in old- age population 
shares than to changes in youth shares.
Old- age dependency is not a given. The compression of morbidity means 
that a signifi cant portion of this population can continue to work, if  they 
so desire. By working longer they can save more than in the past for their 
retirement. But rising income means greater demand for leisure and retire-
ment, and this eﬀect may dominate, leading to early retirement (Costa 1995). 
However, if  retirement is voluntary and older people have saved enough for 
their old age, they are not dependents. Dependency means fi nancing old- 
age consumption through transfers. If  retirement is funded by productive 
savings or own labor supply, then the elderly should not be considered de-
pendent. The case of youth dependency is clearer. Born into the world with 
no fi nancial assets, the young do not have the savings or work- eﬀort poten-
tial that the elderly have, and they are clearly dependent.
Our results suggest that high youth- age shares are negatively associated 
with economic performance in the long run, and high old- age shares may not 
have a signifi cant eﬀect the long run steady- state level of income per capita. 
This stands to be potentially good news for those Asian countries that are 
about to experience a decline in working- age share coupled with an increase 
in the old- age shares. The increase in income in the past, in part boosted 
by the increase in the working- age share, was backed by the decline in the 
youth- age shares. In the future, the decline in working- age share will not 
necessarily bring with it a decline in income, as this demographic trend will 
be backed by an increase in old- age population shares and not an increase 
in youth- age shares.
2.3.3   Behavioral Change: Labor Supply, Savings, and Education
Although the model we proposed in the previous section implies age struc-
ture variables have coeﬃcients of – 1 in the growth equation, the estimation 
revealed otherwise. This indicates that there is some kind of measurement 
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error in age structure eﬀects. This measurement error can be explained by 
accounting and behavioral responses to age structure shifts.
Given well- established life- cycle variations in behavior, it is reasonable 
to suppose that changes in age structure will have eﬀects on aggregate out-
comes. Changes in age structure bring with them changes in labor supply, 
savings, and education as the number of  people engaging in the various 
life- cycle decisions changes. For example, since labor supply tends to fol-
low an inverted U- shaped pattern with respect to age, changes in the age 
composition of the population are likely to have eﬀects on aggregate labor 
supply. Savings rates also vary with age, with the highest rates occurring 
for forty- to seventy- year- olds, implying that changes in the age structure 
will aﬀect aggregate savings rates. Furthermore, increases in life expectancy 
mean that more people survive through the school ages, and the average 
number of years of education increases.
However, in addition to these accounting eﬀects there are also behavioral 
eﬀects of aging. Generational crowding (i.e., being born into a large cohort) 
may have eﬀects on relative wages and individual labor supply (Easterlin 
1980; Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman 1988; Korenman and Neumark 
2000). In addition, falling fertility and youth dependency rates may be 
linked to increased labor market participation, particularly among women, 
as found in Bloom et al. (2009b).
Improvements in life expectancy (which is a proxy for better health) that 
are inherent to an aging society can invoke behavioral responses that have 
a positive eﬀect on economic growth. Better health may improve worker 
productivity (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2004). However, there may also 
be a demographic eﬀect as a longer prospective life span can change life-
 cycle behavior, leading to a longer working life and higher saving for retire-
ment (Bloom, Canning, and Moore 2005; Bloom et al. 2007; Bloom, Can-
ning, and Moore 2007). Moreover, a higher life expectancy may increase 
the incentive to invest in education, as the years over which returns can be 
amortized are extended (Finlay 2006).
Labor Supply
In Bloom et al. (2009b), the authors show that the decline in total fertil-
ity rate has had a signifi cant eﬀect on the increase in female labor force 
participation. They show that a reduction in the fertility rate of one child is 
associated with an increase in labor force participation of four years. With 
fewer children, women have more opportunities to stay in, or reenter, the 
workforce as the time required by child care declines. Increased child care 
services, and the decline in the stigma of a working mother, have helped to 
make the option of women staying in (or reentering) the workforce more 
attractive.
In Bloom et al. (2009b), the Republic of Korea is used as an example to 
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illustrate the eﬀect of  fertility decline on economic growth. The authors 
show that in Korea, demographic eﬀects explain about 14 percent of the 
increase in income per capita. The decline in population growth, the increase 
in the working- age share, and then the positive female labor force participa-
tion response to the decline in the fertility rate all contribute to the rapid rise 
in income per capita in the Republic of Korea.
The behavioral female labor supply response contributes about 25 per-
cent of the 14 percent increase in income per capita. This is only one of the 
behavioral responses that can occur during the demographic transition. Fur-
ther analysis of the savings and education responses may fi nd compounded 
eﬀects compared with those found in Bloom et al. (2007) and may thus yield 
even higher estimates of the income eﬀects of demographic change.
Savings
Central to our understanding of the East Asian “miracle” has been Alwyn 
Young’s work (1994, 1995) showing that rapid economic growth in the re-
gion was mainly due to increases in factor inputs—notably labor, capital, 
and education—and not to improvements in total factor productivity.5 In 
order to understand the rise in income levels in East Asia we must therefore 
understand the driving forces behind the growth in these inputs. All of the 
Asian “Tiger” economies enjoyed a surge in savings and investment during 
their period of rapid economic growth. We focus here on Taiwan, for which 
there are fairly good data on household savings. The private savings rate 
in Taiwan rose from around 5 percent in the 1950s to well over 20 percent 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Savings rates vary by age, being highest in Taiwan 
for households with heads in the fi fty- to sixty- year- old range. We would 
therefore expect changing age structure to be a possible explanation for this 
increase in aggregate saving. Studies that examine the link between demo-
graphic structure and national savings rates do fi nd a strong connection 
(Leﬀ 1969; Fry and Mason 1982; Mason 1987; Mason 1988; Kelley and 
Schmidt 1995; Kelley and Schmidt 1996; Higgins and Williamson 1997; 
Higgins 1998) and suggest that a large part of the savings boom in East Asia 
can be explained by the changing age structure of the population.
However, Deaton and Paxson (2000) show that, based on household sav-
ings data for Taiwan, changes in age structure account for only a modest 
increase in the overall savings rate, perhaps 4 percentage points. They show 
that the rise in the aggregate savings rate has not been mainly due to changes 
in the age composition of the population but, rather, to a secular rise in the 
savings rates of all age groups.
The question then arises as to why savings rates rose at each age. One 
possible explanation, proposed by Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000) is that 
increased savings rates are due to rising life expectancy and a subsequent 
5. This argument is controversial, as discussed in Krugman (1994).
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need to fund retirement income. Tsai, Chu, and Chung (2000) show that the 
timing of the rise in household savings rates matches the increases in life 
expectancy of the population.
With a fi xed retirement age we would expect such a savings eﬀect. How-
ever, Deaton and Paxson (2000) argue that in a fl exible economy, without 
mandatory retirement, the main eﬀect of a rise in longevity will be on the 
span of the working life, with no obvious prediction for the rate of saving. 
Bloom, Canning, and Moore (2005) formalize this argument to show that 
under reasonable assumptions the optimal response to an improvement in 
health and a rise in life expectancy is to increase the length of working life, 
though less than proportionately, with no need to raise saving rates at all (due 
to the gains from enjoying compound interest over a longer life span).
The eﬀect of savings on investment and domestic production depends on 
the nature of the capital market. With perfect capital mobility, demographic 
change may have an impact on international capital fl ows (Higgins 1998). In 
this case, eﬀects on domestic interest rates and investment may be minimal 
(Poterba 2004). However, if  capital markets are imperfect, the demographic 
transition can lead to a mismatch between the investment needs of a large, 
young, working- age population and the retirement savings of older workers 
(Higgins and Williamson 1997).
Education
Demography can aﬀect educational investments through several mecha-
nisms. Perhaps the most important is the quantity- quality trade- oﬀ whereby 
fertility choices and human capital investment decisions are jointly made. 
This framework points to lower fertility rates being both a cause and a conse-
quence of increased educational investments, with both fertility and school-
ing determined by a common set of factors that aﬀect families’ incentives.
Notwithstanding families’ desired fertility, actual fertility in the absence 
of contraception may be much higher. The provision of family planning 
services to populations in which desired fertility is low can both lower fer-
tility outcomes and increase schooling levels. This eﬀect may be particu-
larly pronounced for girls’ schooling because with high fertility, girls are 
frequently kept out of school to help care for their younger siblings. Foster 
and Roy (1997) show how a randomized trial providing family planning ser-
vices in Bangladesh aﬀected both fertility outcomes and children’s school-
ing levels.
The quantity- quality trade- oﬀ can also appear to some extent at the 
national level if  schooling is publicly funded. Smaller youth cohorts can 
increase the availability of educational funding per child and can lead to an 
expansion of public education (Kelley 1996; Lee and Mason 2008).
One reason for an increased incentive to invest in education may be the 
rise in life expectancy. A longer life increases the time over which education 
investments can be recouped. Kalemli- Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) argue 
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that the eﬀect of improved health and longevity on educational investments 
has played a large role in economic growth over the last 150 years. This 
incentive eﬀect, however, is clearly linked to the prospective working life 
rather than total lifespan, suggesting that education levels may be linked to 
planned retirement ages and social security incentives.
2.3.4   Institutional Settings: Social Security
With health improvements and longer life expectancies, the optimal re-
sponse for workers with perfect markets may be to have a longer working 
life. However, mandatory or conventional retirement ages, coupled with the 
strong fi nancial incentives to retire that are inherent in many social security 
systems, seem to result in early retirement and increased needs for saving for 
old age (Bloom et al. 2007).
Generous state transfer systems not only have fi nancing problems, they 
undermine and reduce labor supply of the elderly, increasing eﬀective depen-
dency rates. Many social security systems impose a very high eﬀective tax 
rate on older workers by withholding or reducing benefi ts if  they continue 
to work.
Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong (China) have fully funded universal 
systems. These systems consist of personal accounts so an older worker who 
continues working benefi ts from a larger sum to retire on. These systems 
should not discourage work at older ages and should be associated with high 
savings rates. Taiwan, China, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia do not have 
universal systems. In these countries planning for retirement has historically 
been rare. However, they do have systems for the formal sector and public 
sector that can generate large future liabilities.
Specifi c social security systems were designed for existing demographic 
situations and may not be appropriate as the proportion of elderly contin-
ues to rise. However, transforming these systems once established is very 
diﬃcult politically, as entitlements under the systems are diﬃcult to reduce. 
In countries without universal systems, population aging will put pressure 
on governments to provide more coverage, given the diﬃculties experienced 
by families trying to cope with the issue. The systems put in place will have 
a large impact on how aging aﬀects those economies.
2.4   Summary
In this chapter we have illustrated the eﬀects of aging on economic growth 
in Asia. Aging is driven by a decline in fertility, an increase in life expectancy, 
or the dynamic evolution of past variation in birth and death rates. In the 
fi rst part of the chapter we illustrate these driving forces of aging. We show 
that between 1960 and 2005 the shift in age structure of the population has 
been predominantly driven by the rapid decline in fertility, and between 2005 
and 2050 the dynamic evolution of fertility and mortality changes in the 
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period from 1960 to 2005 will continue to shape the age distribution. In the 
second part of the chapter, we estimated the statistical relationship between 
the youth- age, and old- age population shares and economic growth, both 
in the long run and in the short run. Regression analysis indicates that in 
the long run, old- age shares may not have a signifi cant impact on economic 
growth. A change in the old- age shares has a negative eﬀect on economic 
growth in the short run, but not in the long run. The level of  youth- age 
shares (and the change) has a negative eﬀect on long- run economic perfor-
mance. This result is good news for Asian countries in the long run as the 
old- age population share increases.
We discuss that population aging has more than a simple accounting 
eﬀect on economic growth and we discuss the various behavioral responses 
that come with the shift in age structure: an increase in female labor force 
participation as fertility declines, an increase in savings, and an increase in 
education. These factors act together and may oﬀset any negative account-
ing eﬀects of a shift in the age structure, thus in the regression analysis we 
observe an insignifi cant eﬀect of rising old- age shares on economic perfor-
mance in the long run. Overall, the eﬀect of aging on economic growth will 
be ambiguous, as the various behavioral responses may impose economic 
growth eﬀects of diﬀering magnitudes across diﬀerent countries.
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Comment Roberto S. Mariano
In light of declining total fertility rate (TFR), increasing life expectancy, 
dynamically evolving birth and death patterns, and increasing share of old-
 age population in the age distribution in Asia, this chapter addresses the big 
question: “What are the economic consequences of population aging?”
The methodology used in the chapter uses both qualitative and quanti-
tative approaches. The qualitative analysis in the chapter is structural and 
this part of the chapter brings up interesting research issues which I will not 
get into. Rather, I will focus my comments on the quantitative part of the 
chapter.
The main message in the chapter is that the economic impact of popu-
lation aging depends on behavioral responses, in various dimensions, to the 
shift in the population age distribution. The major factors are:
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